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A LATCRIT SENSIBILITY APPROACHES
THE INTERNATIONAL: REFLECTIONS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AS THIRD
GENERATION SOLIDARITY RIGHTS
ILEANA M. PORRAS*

I approach the task of speaking of a LatCrit perspective on
environmental rights as third generation rights (solidarity
rights), with great trepidation. I am faced with a number of
quandaries.
First and foremost, I face the problem of articulating what a
LatCrit theoretical perspective might be. This requires me to
first consider what it means to unite the two halves of the moniker "Lat" and "Crit." Alone, both Lat and Crit are familiar, if
controversial, terms. The term "Lat," the abbreviated form of
"Latino/a," is enmeshed in at least two significant "identity" debates. One is the controversy over whether Latino/a refers to
race or ethnicity. The second is the importance of gender, or the
issue of the intersectionalityl of race, ethnicity, and gender,
highlighted by the common practice of writing Latino/a.
The term "Crit," because it refers to a host of competing and
supplementing critical legal theories, is controversial in a very
different way. Paradoxically, critical legal theories are suspect
for two discordant reasons: first, their progressive activist tendencies; and second, their association with what are believed to
be the normatively empty "isms" of structuralism, postmodernism, and deconstructionism. The abbreviated form of the term
Crit is already linked to a family of related legal theories including FemCrit, RaceCrit, and QueerCrit. I take it as a given that,
in our struggle to give shape to a LatCrit theoretical perspective,
we mean something more than a RaceCrit perspective from a
.
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Latino/a point of view. The turn to the identifier "Lat," I am
suggesting, should not be understood merely as a substitution for
the identifier "Race" in the term RaceCrit. Otherwise, LatCrit
would be no more than a simple, if necessary, reminder that Latinos/as and their interests are not sufficiently visible within the
RaceCrit "mainstream." Rather, I believe, associated with the
launching of this new term, is the sense that there is a special
critical insight to be gained by the bringing together of Lat and
Crit.
So, what happens when you link the complex set of identity
positions associated with Latino/a to the various critical theories
grouped under the moniker Crit? Do these two terms really fit
together? How does each term modify the other? And how, in
any case, do they relate to "rights"? Is the LatCrit position closer
to a Crit's critique of rights, or closer to a RaceCrits' critique of
the critique of rightsposition?
The second quandary I face in speaking on the subject of a
LatCrit perspective on environmental rights is that although we
may talk of "environmental rights," it would be hard to sustain a
claim that such rights have a formal existence. Even the most
determined rights advocates can do little more than point to
strands of language in various national and international instruments that are suggestive of "environmental rights," or argue that the existence of such rights is "inherent in" or
"derivative" of other more formal rights. 2 Thus, environmental
rights, we are told, are inherent in the right to life, the right to
health, and the right to security. Most commentators on socalled "emerging" environmental rights ultimately admit that
there is, of course, no consensus as to the content, reach, or effect
of such rights. Nevertheless, we are told such rights are essential and our inability to achieve them is evidence of a failure of
environmental will.
The third quandary is, even assuming I assent to the existence of something to which we will apply the term "environmental rights," I must ask why it has seemed so natural to relegate such rights to the "third generation." That is, a generation

2. See, e.g., Patricia W. Birnie & Alan E. Boyle, The Structure of InternationalEnvironmentalLaw III: The Role of National Law and the Role to a Decent Environment, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 188 (1992); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights,
Environmental Rights, and the Right to the Environment, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103 (1991).
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of rights which, because its main exemplar is the right to development, is often treated by commentators in the first world as
though it were a concern of developing countries alone. The ascription of the label "third generation" to environmental rights
presents two further somewhat contradictory problems. First,
because traditional human rights attach to, and may be asserted
by, individuals whereas third generation rights are said to attach to groups and cannot be asserted through traditional human rights mechanisms, many human rights activists dismiss
them as not "true" human rights. Further, third generation
rights are said to deflect attention from true and important human rights or even to justify the postponement of the application
of such core human rights. Thus, those who advocate third generation rights are considered to be either misguided or cynical
manipulators of the human rights discourse. It is thus not surprising to find that human rights case books give no more than
cursory treatment to third generation rights and generally present them as being in conflict with first generation rights. Second, to include environmental rights alongside the right to development raises the question of the relationship between
environmental rights and developmental rights. Many advocates
of the right to development are uncomfortable with any attempt
to place explicit limits on that right. While recognizing that no
right is absolute but must yield to some degree in the face of
other competing rights, yet they seek to retain the expression of
the right in its absolute form. 3 The elaboration of a right to environment that occupies a space adjacent to that of the right to development, may be too close for comfort, and may be experienced
as a deliberate affront by those who have been toiling for the recognition of a right to development.
The fourth quandary is that, regardless of the generations of
rights and beyond the critique (or the critique of the critique) of
rights, it is important to consider whether rights discourse is a
useful framework within which to consider and address environmental problems. Even commentators who generally favor
the future elaboration of environmental rights recognize two serious limitations of the traditional human rights prism when
turned on the environment.
3. See Ileana M. Porras, The Rio Declaration: A New Basis for InternationalCooperation, 1 REV. EUR. COMM. & INT'L ENVTL L. 245 (1992), reprinted in GREENING
INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (Philippe Sands ed., 1993).
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In the first place, environmental problems are considered to
have a multigenerational dimension. The central concept of sustainable development, for instance, assumes a responsibility by
the present generation towards future generations. A traditional
human rights approach is not well-suited to address the needs of
future generations. Indeed, the traditional human rights regime, concerned with the present needs of individuals, may well
work against the equitable obligation of sacrificing in the present
to preserve the future.
In the second place, and perhaps more controversial, many
people, including myself, believe that an anthropocentric approach to the environment leaves a whole host of environmental
values out of our calculations. Since human rights discourse is
anthropocentric by its very nature, this means that only humanoriented environmental values will be emphasized.
Finally, if we consider the state of the environment today
and attempt to list the most critical environmental problems, we
will see how unsusceptible they are to correction through a
rights solution.
My list of such environmental problems would include:
* The irretrievable loss of biodiversity on land and sea and
the consequent destruction of well-functioning ecosystems;
* The strain on the environment of increasing human demand for fresh water, air, energy, and land, which has grown
along with population growth, but also in response to more consuming lifestyles;
e The depletion of the ozone layer and the effects of climate
change;
* The need to dispose of the hazardous by-products of our
productive activities. (Most environmental harm results from
otherwise beneficial activities.)
* The exportation of hazardous activities, products, and
wastes to poorer states where transplant and disposal are
deemed "cheaper."
Obviously, in the short time assigned for my presentation, I
can only begin to touch on some of these issues. I will begin by
taking on the challenge of articulating what a LatCrit theoretical
perspective might be.
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The first, and perhaps very obvious, point is that LatCrit
must, by definition, recognize the constructed nature of all identity positions. That is, LatCrit theorists are aware at every moment that the identity position they identify with, let us call it
the "Latino/a identity," is a construct whose contours, content,
and meaning are perpetually shifting.
By "identity" here, I mean the recognition of a set of commonalties and affinities expressed through an associative desire
and giving rise to a sense of special responsibility. This associative desire is driven in part by both the human urge for recognition and valuation and the search for a sense of belonging with
its goal of protection and the possibility of political action. This
unstable Latino/a identity intersects with and is modified by a
multiplicity of other equally constructed and unstable identities
organized around the concepts of gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, and sexual orientation.
One of the fascinating things about the Latino/a identity, as
we have discovered over the past series of discussions (the first
LatCrit Conference in La Jolla and earlier discussions at this
Colloquium), is that the Latino/a identity cannot be reduced to
any of the other identity categories. Persons who self-identify as
Latino/a include individuals who also identify with either gender, every race, every ethnicity, every nationality, and every
manner of sexual orientation. In this sense the Latino/a identity
is truly sui generis. Unique, not in that all other identities are
somehow simpler or in fact more homogeneous, but rather that
the Latino/a identity contains already and visibly within itself an
irreducible confusion which begs the question of "identity."
Such a claim may at first seem both naive and dangerous.
After all, it may be argued, while it is true that identity is constructed, the construction of a Latino/a identity is constrained
because it emerges within a U.S. context entirely occupied by a
black and white paradigm. Furthermore, the legal protections
achieved in the United States will only protect Latinos/as, if to
be identified as Latino/a is to make a claim to a race or an ethnicity.
It would, therefore, be irresponsible to insist on a
nonethnic, nonracial classification. How can Latinos/as hold to
their sense of an identity which is always breaking down the
classifications of race, ethnicity, gender, class, sexual orientation, etc., while pursuing particular political or social agendas
which appear to require the reduction of our Latino/a identity to
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either race or ethnicity?
This is where adopting a distinctive LatCrit theoretical perspective may help us out of the apparent impasse. A LatCrit
perspective permits us to characterize Latino/a as a race or an
ethnicity if it is strategically important to do so. It is, after all,
that too. A LatCrit perspective is not dogmatic and is open to all
possibilities.
But a LatCrit perspective also requires us to step back and
remember that Latino/a is not only a race or an ethnicity. It allows us not to be overly attached to any of these identity classifications and reminds us that they are themselves fluid and constructed. Further, a LatCrit theoretical perspective should
remind us that, while short term benefits may be occasionally
derived from playing from within a system that relies on single
characteristic identity classification, ultimately we may simply
be reinforcing the very system that oppresses Latinos/as. To enter naively into the game of proper classification is to become entangled in a discourse of distinguishing, parsing, and discriminating to determine who is in and who is out.
What I am suggesting is that the LatCrit theoretical perspective should stand for a politics of inclusion. Our shared constructed Latino/a identity requires that we value our differences
as well as our commonalities. A LatCrit perspective should recognize and celebrate the simultaneity of identities. We must
therefore seek to be as unconstraining and nonexclusive as possible. Rather than expend our energies trying to delimit the contours of our Latino/a identity, we should leave the boundaries of
that identity as vague as possible. At a time when identity politics seems to be inexorably leading us to narrower and narrower
forms of distinctiveness through particularism, a LatCrit perspective reminds us of the impossibility of achieving perfectly
bounded identities while offering us a vision of the multifaceted
forms of connection and relatedness that is always available.
What does this have to do with the "international"?
Historically (and very much so today), one of the difficulties
that Latinos/as have faced is the problem of their association
with what I will call "the foreign." Regardless of the means
whereby a Latino/a came to be part of the U.S. polity-whether
by annexation, conquest, migration, immigration, or birth-we
have been suspect as being "foreign" or of having a "foreign alle-
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giance." Our reaction has been to deny our foreignness, to position ourselves as domestic by reassigning foreignness to others,
especially those others, outside the borders, who are most like
US.
At its worst, this has led Latinos/as to reject those outside
the U.S. geopolitical boundaries and to deny the "natural" connection that others impute to us. For those of you who have seen
John Sayles' movie Lone Star, it is Gloria, herself, a wetback
from an earlier generation and now a well-to-do restaurant
owner, who calls the Border Patrol to denounce "wetbacks" she
discovers in her backyard. It is Gloria who imposes an Englishonly policy on her Spanish-speaking workers because "we are in
America." It is our attempt to convey, in order to deflect suspicion, that we do know the difference between "us" and "them." It
is a move that allows us to insist that while we may be Latinos/as, we are USLats within the border. Outside the United
States' geopolitical boundaries, on the other hand, they are
"foreigners." The problem is that this perspective and positioning forces us to split in two, to deny part of ourselves.
A LatCrit theoretical perspective allows us to avoid the
crippling necessity of crafting a USLat identity by denying what,
for the sake of symmetry, I will term the OtroLat.
A LatCrit theoretical perspective requires that we recall the
contingency of all geopolitical boundaries, that is, the contingency and constructed nature of nation and national identity. As
LatCrit theorists, we are free to recognize that often the only
thing that distinguishes "us" from "them" is that we have the
right set of papers and they do not.
This is not to say that a LatCrit perspective requires that we
abandon or eliminate our borders or claim that borders are
meaningless. On the contrary, many of us are very strongly attached to an identity position we refer to as "American" even
while we may admit it is geographically constructed. There is
nothing surprising about the claim that Latinos/as as a group
are as patriotic and committed to something called the United
States as any other group of Americans. But as LatCrits we
should be comfortable in holding on simultaneously to our "U.S."
identity and to our Lat identity, even if that Lat identity spills
over the borders. There is no reason why an identity need be
contained within a set of geopolitical boundaries and no reason
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to assume we must choose one identity over the other.
Having freed ourselves from the fear of the taint of foreignness at home without relinquishing our Lat identity, when we
allow our associative effectiveness and sense of responsibility to
spill over across our U.S. borders, we must yet face a greater international challenge. We must face the fact that in the eyes of
the OtroLat, we will likely not be recognized as USLats, but just
as U.S., which should bring us up short in our venture into the
international.
When acting on the international plane, the identity that
will be ascribed to us by others and, if we are honest, the identity
we should ascribe to ourselves in the first place, is that of a U.S.
national. After all, we cannot escape the fact that once we move
to the international, we are acting in a sphere organized around
the concept of a community of nation-states. When faced by others whose identities and interests are expressed as "national,"
we will bring our own national identity to the fore. Regardless of
our sense of a shared history of oppression, discrimination, or
disadvantage, we will be heard, by OtroLats, as speaking from a
privileged position, representing a rich and powerful nation with
an imperial expansionist past and a domineering present.
A LatCrit theoretical perspective, rather than rejecting this
characterization as wrong or unfair, will acknowledge the fact
that it does hold a kernel of truth. I cannot speak as a Latina
without at the same time speaking as a Norte Americana. I am a
Norte Americana and when I speak, even when I speak as a
Latina, I speak from a privileged perspective vis-a-vis other
peoples. A LatCrit perspective teaches me that in treading into
the international, I cannot simply leave my U.S. identity behind,
even if I wanted to, because it goes with me. I should not ask
others to respond to me as though my nationality was not a constitutive part of my identity and my perspective. Even when I
am being critical of the United States, I am critical as an insider.
My critique is necessarily one shaped by that condition of being
an American, even if a USLat. Thus, a LatCrit perspective
teaches me to proceed with caution into the international.
So, where does this leave us? Have we come any closer to
addressing the question of what a LatCrit perspective on environmental rights, as third generation solidarity rights, might be?
Here are some thoughts:
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LatCrit theorists must seek to forge an identity that embraces differences and change in order to confront a world that is
involved in an attempt to eliminate difference. What this means,
inter alia, is that a LatCrit perspective must be sensitive to the
dangers of all universalizing rhetoric. Attempts at setting international standards, for instance, must be viewed with a degree of
skepticism. Whose values should such standards reflect? Who is
to benefit from the harmonization of legal regimes? Should we
really be engaged in the popular project of exporting our environmental standards, rules, regulations, and institutions, for
wholesale adoption, to other states?
A LatCrit perspective sensitive to difference must recognize
that environmental standards will reflect different values and
different contexts. The same standard may not be appropriate
everywhere. Different standards should not simply be tolerated
or treated as deviations from our appropriate norms, they should
instead be approached with respect. Approaching the choice of a
standard with respect does not require simple acquiescence nor
does it imply that we should forego inquiry into the nature of
such a standard, rather it means that we should drop our arrogant certainty in the universal rightness of our own standard or
choice and abandon the presumption that all departures from
what we think is right are motivated by illegitimate interests.
While a change in attitude may seem a modest proposal, if the
history of international relations is a guide, it will be a difficult
achievement.
The turn to human rights discourse as a means to address
environmental degradation can be understood as part of the
greater project of global harmonization. Human rights by their
very nature are considered to be universal. The content of a
right to the environment must, in order to be within the spirit of
human rights discourse, be identical for all. Human rights
rhetoric does not allow some people to be less protected than
others. The result must be that the substantive content of a
right to environment must be unacceptably low from the perspective of those who are promoting the adoption of such a right
or it must be unachievably high from the perspective of those
who labor under conditions of limited capacity, capabilities and
competition.
A LatCrit perspective should not treat development needs
and arguments as somehow illegitimate. Rather, it should seek
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to understand the potent arguments for the recognition of a right
to development and not respond to the assertion of development
needs as always necessarily a desire to ignore all environmental
consequences.
Human rights discourse has been criticized by many in the
Third World as a particularly nefarious instance of Western imperialism, a mechanism that justifies interference with the internal affairs of less powerful states. A LatCrit perspective,
while recognizing the origin and respecting the seriousness of
this charge, need not simply assent to the critique.
Rather, our USLat experience allows us to question the assertion that any government represents or speaks for all people
equally. A LatCrit perspective thus requires us to inquire about
the distribution of costs and benefits of any given environmental
regime. In particular, it makes us realize the importance of information, participation in decisionmaking, and the relevance of
making the government and private sectors accountable.
On the other hand, we must reflect seriously on the way in
which placing an issue into the human rights framework does in
fact accent the problem in a very particular way. While human
rights are universally applicable, our tendency in the North is to
think that all human rights violations are taking place in the
South. Despite recent attempts to highlight the reality of a
South within the North, or to point out human rights failures in
our own systems, we are likely to consider ourselves the good
guys once we enter the game of comparative international
achievements. We may not be perfect, we will admit, but we are
pretty good compared to those other guys.
During the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) 4 negotiations in Rio, I found myself in an
odd position. I am an environmentalist. Yet, as a Costa Rican
representative working with the G-77 group of developing countries, I fought the adoption of "environmental" language in various principles. Why? Because within the international context,
it became clear to me that the need to address the human threat
to the environment could and was being used by some in the
North, sometimes unwittingly, as a means to continue the

4. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
AIonf. 151/5 (June 13, 1992).
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North's economic domination. Northern countries were unwilling to undertake significant reform of their practices of environmental exploitation because the pain of the change to their
economies and to the lifestyles of their citizens was deemed unacceptable. Nonetheless, they were quite willing to advocate
equally painful measures to the governments of Southern states.
The North was not ready to accept their fair share of the pain of
environmental reform. Furthermore, it was unwilling to admit
to the responsibility that flows from its historic and continuing
role in the disproportionate exploitation of the world's natural
and environmental resources and its concomitant disproportionate contribution to global environmental harms. Instead, the
North's focus was on the predicted increased amount of environmental harm that would flow from the South, as populations
expanded and environmental exploitation went unchecked.
While the Rio negotiations resulted in an apparently symmetrical acceptance of mutual responsibility through, for instance, the call to reduce population growth tied to a call to reform consumption patterns, that symmetry is nothing but a
mirage. In the existing international context, developing countries have no tools available to them to force the North to reduce
consumption, whereas the North, with its hands on the pursestrings, has many ways to impose conditions on developing countries.
Back to my fundamental question. Can a traditional human
rights approach lead to a greater degree of environmental protection? If not, should we abandon the enterprise?
As Rall SAnchez has just argued, a human rights approach
may be helpful in redressing individual wrongs at the national
level. It is only likely to be helpful, however, if a national right
to a healthy environment is backed by specific tort and nuisance
legislation providing easy access to administrative and judicial
forums, broad standing, and meaningful remedies. Such a system will help provide remedies for and perhaps even prevent
specific abuses. A right to a healthy environment may in this
way prove extremely valuable. But the central dilemma remains, how can even an enhanced human rights framework help
us prevent more diffuse environmental problems? How can it
provide redress for environmental harms where no individual or
group is particularly harmed, yet all of us now, future generations, and the environment itself are harmed?
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The danger is that if we get too caught up in crafting new
present-looking human rights and remedies for individuals and
groups, we may mask the fact that we are all more generally responsible for environmental harm. We may ignore the obvious
circumstance that it is our collective and cumulative actions, our
"normal" practices of escalating production, consumption, and
waste in the pursuit of economic well-being and daily comfort,
that are to blame for the sad state of the environment, and not,
as some would have it, the "abnormal" actions of a few, identifiable, bad agents.
So then, what can a LatCrit perspective bring to all this?
Well, right now it is too early to say. The one thing we can hope
is that a LatCrit sensibility will not abandon the sophisticated
understanding of context and the contingency of identity and law
when turning to the international.
A LatCrit perspective must help us to rethink the meaning
of universalism in the international. We must strive to articulate a claim about universalism that leads us neither to the
disabling arguments of moral relativism, nor towards the difference eliminating doctrine of harmonization. As LatCrits we need
not accept claims about sovereignty as a barrier to assessing or
opining about what is going on environmentally within any given
geopolitical borders. We can and should have a principled position concerning human dignity and the natural ecosystem and
seek to promote those views. But we must resist the simple attempt at imposing our own standards on others and resist the
trend towards homogenization of human diversity, which seems
to follow so naturally from the moment of globalization in which
we are told we exist.

